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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EQUAL PROTECTION - LEGALITY OF
PLANS FOR MAINTAINING ScHOOL SEGREGATION-On May 19, 1954,
the Supreme Court of the United States declared that segregation
in public schools was a denial of equal protection of the law.1 Since
that date many and varied plans have been proposed to maintain
segregated education by avoiding the impact of the decision. The
legality of three of these proposed avoidance devices will be analyzed in this comment.

I. Private School Systems
Since the restraints of the Fourteenth Amendment apply only
to state action2 whi~ denies equal protection, any analysis of a
1
2

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S._ 483, 74 S.Ct. 686 (1954).
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18 (1883); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68

1956]

COMMENTS

1143

proposed plan to preserve segregation by reliance upon a private
rather than public school system must question whether the discriminatory action of private schools can be held to be action
of the state. It is impossible to draw a clear distinction between
what is private action and what is public action.3 The concept
of state action has been continually expanc;led to include some
action formerly regarded as private.4 On the hypothesis that a
private school has been established and that discrimination by that
school has been proved, this comment will first examine the factors
which would tend to indicate that this action is, in fact, action of
the state.
A. State Economic Assistance. The Supreme Court has not
yet analyzed thoroughly the impact of state financial assistance on
the "private" character of othenvise non-public institutions. It is
agreed that state financing may become so crucial to the existence
of a private school and may create such a relationship between a
state and a school that an othenvise private school must be regarded
as a state instrumentality. There is, however, disagreement over
the kind and degree of financial aid which will cause a private
school to be deemed a state instrumentality.
Whether or not a state retained its public school system, a few
private schools would be able to finance their operations almost
entirely by tuition payments. At most, state assistance to these
schools would be in the form of free bus transportation, free text
books, and state tax exemptions. If a state granted this aid only to
those private schools which are segregated, and conditioned the aid
upon continued segregation by the grantee, the state would clearly
be denying equal protection because of race. 5 If, however, the
benefits of this aid were given to integrated as well as to segregated private schools, then, since this would have the same economic effect as a direct subsidy, segregation would deny equal protection only if the aid were considered to convert the private school
into a state_ instrumentality. Tax exemptions have been a tradiS.Ct. 836 (1948). To disregard the requirement of state action would materially alter the
federal system and transfer control over private rights to the i;iational government.
3 In a sense, private action not prohibited is permitted by the state and thus has its
basis in law. ·what is to be considered private action or state action is a matter of custom
and may change with conditions. Barnett, "What is State Action Under the Fourteenth,
Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments of the Constitution?" 24 ORE. L. REv. 227 (1945).
4 Since there is no privilege of national citizenship (U.S. CoNsr., amend. XIV) to
education, Congress cannot protect the Negro against private action.
5 Inequality in the selection of subjects of taxation and beneficiaries of a tax exemption does not deny "economic equal protection." Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301
U.S. 495 at 509, 57 s.9t. 868 (1937).
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tional form of assistance to private schools and, standing alone,
should be consistent with a school's private character. In the
analogous area of state aid to sectarian schools, a tax exemption
in favor of a sectarian school or hospital which served only a special
class is not a denial of equal protection so long as the exemption
is available on equal terms to like institutions of other sects. 6
The Court has also held that providing free bus transportation
and free textbooks for all school children, including pupils in
sectarian schools, does not violate the non-establishment principle. 7 This type of aid was justified by the Court on the theory
that it directly benefited only the child, and thus was not aid to a
religion as such. By analogy it could be argued that similar aid
for the benefit of students of both races is not aid to segregated
private schools and thus does not "establish" a public school. The
sectarian aid cases, however, offer an ambiguous analogy. On the
one hand, since there is an express constitutional policy prohibiting
the establishment of religion whereas the prohibition of discrimination in public schools has only' been implied from the Fourteenth Amendment, it would seem that if aid to a sectarian school
does not establish a religion, similar aid to a segregated private
school would, a fortiori, not establish it as a state instrumentality.
On the other hand, the principle of religious liberty may allow
more state financial assistance to be given to parochial schools of
a religious minority than to private schools organized to continue
segregation.8 When private school segregation is involved, the
Court rpay well abandon its "benefit-to-the-child" theory and
recognize that aid to the child is, in fact, aid to the school9 since
it defrays costs othenvise borne by the school system.10
But the question of whether a private school would become
a state instrumentality by receipt of such minor economic benefits
is more academic than real. If a mass private school system were
See 61 HARv. L. R.Ev. 344 (1948).
Everson v. Board of Education, 331 U.S. I, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1947); Cochran v. Board of
Education, 281 U.S. 370, 50 S.Ct. 335 (1930).
s Nicholson, "The Legal Standing of the South's School Resistance Proposals," 7 S.C.
L.Q. I (1954).
9 Judd v. Board of Education, 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E. (2d) 576 (1938).
10 The power of eminent domain can be constitutionally delegated to a private school
only for a public purpose. This test is satisfied if there is any public benefit or advantage
from the use of the property to be acquired and even though the benefits are limited to a
small class, as long as that class is selected without discrimination from the general public.
53 MICH. L. R.Ev. 883 (1955). A private school may not be able validly to exercise the power
if its charter does not guarantee that students are to be selected without discrimination.
Connecticut College v. Calvert, 87 Conn. 421, 88 A. 633 (1913).
6
7
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set up in a state, few parents could afford to pay the actual cost
per student. Substantial state subsidies would be indispensable if a
private school system were to be a successful substitute for the present public school system. The legislature itself would deny equal
protection if the subsidy were conditioned upon the school remaining segregated. But even if state subsidies were given to both integrated and segregated private schools, a subsidy might create such
a relationship between the state and a segregated private school
that the school would be deemed an instrumentality of the state.
In Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library,11 it was held that an originally
private library school became a state instrumentality upon receiving a subsidy equalling ninety percent of its costs. That percentage
was the basis for distinguishing the Kerr case in a later decision
which held that a segregated school receiving merely a twenty-three
percent subsidy retained its private character.12 Completely apart
from their merits, these two decisions indicate the dilemma faced in
choosing an approach to the question raised, namely, when does a
private school become a state instrumentality by reason of state
financing? If an arbitrary limit were placed on the amount of state
financing which a private school could receive without becoming a
state instrumentality, then a limited amount of public assistance
equally available to all schools would not necessarily make the
action of a segregated school state action.13 The personal right to
an integrated public school education would thus depend upon
small differences in the amount of a state subsidy. The alternative
is not to draw any line in these cases, so that any subsidization
would make the action of a private school state action. Proposed
standards for determining when state assistance is such that a
private school must be regarded as a state instrumentality suggest that this conclusion should follow when state aid substantially or practically supports a school,14 or provides its means of
existence, since this gives the school the power to discriminate. 16
11 (4th Cir. 1945) 149 F. (2d) 212, cert. den. 326 U.S. 721, 66 S.Ct. 26 (1945). Although
there were other factors, the opinion stressed the economic assistance and said that since
the state had supplied the means of existence it had supplied the means by which the
school was able to discriminate.
12 Norris v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, (D.C. Md. 1948) 78 F. Supp. 451.
The opinion also relied upon the lack of any public control over the school's management.
The test of public control as the exclusive indicia of a state agency was rejected in Nixon
v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 at 89, 52 S.Ct. 484 (1932).
13 Some public aid is consistent with a private character. Bull v. Stichman, 189 Misc.
597 (1947), affd. 298 N.Y. 516, 80 N.E. (2d) 661 (1948).
14 See 62 HARv. L. REv. 126 (1948).
15 See 29 IND. L.J. 125 (1953). Although state aid is given on a non-discriminatory basis,
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As a matter of economics, a private school is supported and given
the means of existence by a state whether the subsidy is one hundred percent or only 1 percent of its costs if the subsidy is in fact
necessary for the school to remain a solvent and going concern.
These proposed criteria .do not answer the fundamental issue
involved, namely, will state assistance in any amount or only in
excess. of an arbitrary limit make. an otherwise priv<1;te school a
state instrumentality and discrimination by it state action? This
issue must be decided in any case where state assistance is the
only possible ground present for holding the subsidized private
action to be state action. In future private school cases, however,
the existence of several factors besides that of financial assistance
may support a conclusion of unconstitutional state action and thus
will enable the Court to avoid the dilemma involved in a decision
based on the factor of economic aid alone.
If and when a state withdraws from public education, the public
school facilities would probably be transferred by lease or sale to
the private organizations. A transfer for an inadequate consideration would be the economic equivalent of a financial subsidy, thus
raising again the question discussed above. 16 Even though the private school pays full rental value for the leased facilities, a state
could not avoid its duty to prevent discriminatory use of publicly
owned property on the theory that the property was now controlled
by a private lessee; a discriminatory admission policy practiced by
the lessee would be unconstitutional state action.17 However, if the
property were acquired in fee for full and adequate consideration,
the discriminatory exclusion of Negroes should not be held to be
state action in and of itself, but, rather, action taken by an owner
of private property.18
and although it does not turn the recipient into a state agency, the note writer argues that
the aid can be enjoined if the private recipient discriminates in sharing its benefits. This
seems to assume a duty on the part of the state to see that public funds (such as veterans'
benefits?) are used without discrimination by the private recipient.
16 Upon dissolution, a school board is under a duty to obtain the market value of its
assets. A dissenting taxpayer can enjoin a gift of the property, even though it is for a
worthy cause. Application of Ross, 127 N.Y.S. (2d) 411 (1954).
17 Lawrence v. Hancock, (D.C. W.Va. 1948) 76 F. Supp. 1004; Muir v. Louisville Park
Theatrical Assn., (6th Cir. 1953) 202 F. (2d) 275, revd. per curiam 347 U.S. 971, 74 S.Ct.
783 (1954) ("remanded for consideration in the light of •.. Brown v. Board of Education ... and conditions that now prevail"). See 29 IND. L.J. 125 (1953).
18 Huber, "Revolution in Private Law," 6 S.C. L.Q. 8 at 13 (1953), argues that state
court enforcement of this right would violate the rule of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I,
68 S.Ct. 836 (1948). Any court judgment is state action; it is invalid only if it balances
the rights of neighbors under restrictive covenants over the right to buy land, but probably
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Instead of direct financial subsidies a state might use its taxing power to encourage private individuals to contribute to private
schools. After abolishing public schools the state might, for instance, increase taxes by five times the amount now appropriated
to education and then grant a six dollar credit against taxes for
every dollar contributed to any private school in the state.
Whether a school financed by contributions obtained in such a
manner would retain its private character might depend upon
which of two competing lines of reasoning a court would follow.
The Social Security Act19 grants a ninety percent credit against
the federal tax for contributions made by employers to similar
state funds. The act would have been invalid if the conduct of the
state and the taxpayer encouraged by the credit had not been within the scope of congressional power.2 ° Congress could have collected the tax and provided unemployment compensation under
its power to spend for the general welfare. The tax was valid because it served as a substitute for conduct which was within the
scope of the taxing power; the tax and the conduct were equivalents. Judged by this standard the suggested state taxing statute
would be invalid because a person could avoid the tax only by
doing an act which if done by the state would make the discriminatory action of private schools invalid state action.
On the other· hand, the federal income, estate, and gift taxes
allow deductions for contributions to educational, religious, and
charitable institutions. 21 The rationale of the allowance is the
assumption that these institutions, if not supported by private contributions, would have to be supported by Congress under its
power to spend for the general welfare. The policy behind the
deduction is that society benefits more when people are encouraged
to channel their money into what they believe to be the most
worthwhile charities than when Congress spends for what it thinks
best. The validity of the deduction must then be based, at least
in part, on the assumption that the conduct being encouraged is
related to activities which could be within the federal spending
power. This assumption has never been questioned even though
Congress is prohibited by the First Amendment from spending
valid if it balances the right of an owner of land over a stranger's right to enter. See part
I-E infra.
19 49 Stat. L. 620 (1935), 42 U.S.C. (1952) §§301-1305.
20 Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 57 S.Ct.
21 I.R.C., §§170, 2055, 2522.

883 (1937).
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to support a religion, so that the conduct to be encouraged is, to
that extent, unrelated to legitimate congressional powers and
would be unconstitutional if done directly by Congress. An
analogous state tax plan might then be held valid unless defeated by
its evasive purpose.
Instead of directly subsidizing private schools, a state might
reimburse parents who sent their children to any private school
within the state. It could be argued that by the reimbursement
method the state has removed itself one step further from the area
of education and has made its relationship to the school more indirect. A court could, however, easily trace the subsidy through
the parents to the schools and hold that a state cannot do indirectly
what it cannot do directly. In such a case the issue would once
again arise whether the aid thus received was sufficient to convert
the private school into a state instrumentality. In any event, the
reimbursement plan would be invalid if state statutes also regulated
the management of private segregated schools.
State financial assistance in any form would require supervision
in order to minimize waste and corruption. Smith v. Allwright22
held that a political party lost its private character and became a
state instrumentality because of the duties imposed upon it by
statutory regulation of primary elections.23 By its control of the
entire primary and general election procedure, the state had
adopted, controlled, and enforced a political party's discriminatory
denial of the right to vote in a primary, thus making it unconstitutional state action. In attempts to evade the Allwright decision,
some states set up different primary systems, proving that they
could be run without statutory controls. But the practical operation of a private school system would require the state to provide
for such matters as financial aid, compulsory attendance, uniform
standards of curricula, and qualifications of teachers. 24 State control over the management and affairs of private schools would make
a private school system analogous to the primary election system
in the Allwright case. Such comprehensive statutory control would
321 U.S. 649, 64 S.Ct. 757 (1944).
Statutory regulation also implies recognition of the public or governmental function
of an institution. See part I-D infra. See also Barnett, "What is State Action Under the
Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments of the Constitution?" 24 ORE. L. REv.
227 (1945).
24 Provision might also have to be made for continuing teachers' tenure laws, not only
to attract and keep teachers but also to avoid impairing the obligation of present tenure
contract rights.
22
23
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indicate that the private schools were in fact state educational
instrumentalities pursuing a policy of segregation adopted and
enforced by the state.
B. The Factor of Withdrawal. In an attempt to evade the
impact of the Allwright decision South Carolina repealed its
statutes relating to primary elections. Nonetheless, Rice v. Elmore25 held that a party's discriminatory denial of the right to
vote in its primary was unconstitutional state action even though
the primary was conducted under party rules, not state law. The
court's rationale was that, despite the repeal of statutes relating to
pri11:aries, the state, by its general election procedure, continued
to adopt, control, and enforce, as a matter of fact and custom, what
was done in the primary. The primary was still as much a part of
the general election as if it were regulated by statute. But a different rationale has been ascribed to the Rice decision by some
writers. 26 The purpose of repealing all statutes relating to the
primary was to abolish the basis of the A llwright decision which
protected the Negro's right to vote in a primary, and thus to enable
a political party to continue its all-white primary. The action of
the state in withdrawing its control from primary elections was
taken with the intent to expose the Negro to the potential loss
of an existing right to vote in the primary. The withdrawal itself
became unconstitutional state action when a political party actually
did refuse to give Negros a vote in the primary. Analogously,
by repealing statutes relating to the public school system and withdrawing from the area, it could be argued that a state intended to
remove the basis of the Brown decision, and thus expose the Negro
to potential loss of an existing right to a non-segregated education.
The withdrawal becomes unconstitutional state action when a
private school refuses to admit the Negro.
The proposition that the action of the state in completely
withdrawing from an area becomes unconstitutional when a private
group is thus enabled to and does discriminate must rest upon the
tacit assumption that when a state completely withdraws from an
area of activity it is under an affirmative duty to prevent private
persons who subsequently enter that area from discriminating. 27
25 (4th Cir. 1947) 165 F. (2d) 387, cert. den. 333 U.S. 875, 68 S.Ct. 905 (1948).
26 See Hale, "Rights Under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments Against Injuries Inflicted by Private Individuals," 6 LAw. GUILD REv. 627 (1946); Nicholson, "The

Legal Standing of the South's School Resistance Proposals," 7 S.C. L.Q. 1 (1954); 47 CoL.
L. REv. 76 (1947).
27 In Tniax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 42 S.Ct. 124 (1921), a state had, by statute, with-
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There has been no indication in any case that such a duty exists.28
Moreover, since practical enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment would require an injunction against the private school, there
is a conceptual problem of enjoining a private school because of
the unconstitutional action of the state when the school has not
been connected in any way with the action of the state. The actual
rationale of the Rice case would be applicable in this situation if,
after repealing its statutes, the state continued, as a matter of fact
and custom, to adopt and give effect to what was done by the private
schools, so that the private schools could still be regarded as part
of a state school system.

C. State Inaction as Unconstitutional State Action. No
decision of the Supreme Court has expressly accepted or rejected
the principle that state inaction may constitute a denial of equal
protection.29 The Court has not had to resort to the inaction
theory, with all its far-reaching implications, because in most cases
state inaction and action have been two sides of the same fact
situation involving unequal protection. Thus, in Shelley v. Kraemer,30 equal protection was denied by the Court's positive action
in enforcing a racial covenant, not by the inaction of the state in
failing to bar a widespread pattern of discrimination by private
persons. A few decisions have been interpreted as applying the
theory of inaction, even though they did not expressly adopt the
drawn the protection previously afforded by the injunction remedy in labor disputes. It
was held that this statute deprived an owner of property without due process of law when
he lost customers because of unenjoined picket lines. Thus it could be argued that the
state's withdrawal placed it under a duty to protect property from injurious strikes made
possible by the statutory withdrawal of state protection.
28 When a state leases public property, the private lessee's discriminatory use of the
property is invalid state action, not because the state upon withdrawal from active management owed a duty to prevent discrimination by its private lessee, but because the state
could not escape its duty to prevent discriminatory use of publicly owned property by
leasing it. See note 17 supra.
29 This theory has been accepted in lower federal courts: United States v. Blackburn,
(D.C. Mo. 1874) 24 Fed. Cas. 1159, No. 14,603; Louisville &: N.R. Co. v. Bosworth, (D.C.
Ky. 1915) 230 F. 191 at 207. In Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 55 S.Ct. 622 (1935), the
Court upheld a "private" political party's exclusion of Negroes from the primary even
though the state did nothing to prevent the discrimination. In view of the later case of
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 S.Ct. 757 (1944), the Grovey case seems to mean not
that inaction can never deny equal protection, but that there the state was under no duty
to act to prevent discrimination by a private "club" in the selection of its membership. In
the absence of such a duty, the state's inaction could not breach a duty to act, and thus
could not deny equal protection.
30 334 U.S. I, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948). In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55 (1932),
the "failure to make an effective appointment of counsel for the accused" was merely part
of the over-all state acUon of not giving the defendant a fair trial.
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concept. Thus, in Terry v. Adams,31 Justice Black's opinion
stressed the fact that the state's acquiesence in the Jaybird primary
device permitted the discriminatory action of a private political
party to produce the equivalent of a prohibited election; in effect,
the opinion held this form of inaction to be invalid state action.
The Fourteenth Amendment imposes a duty on a state not to
deny equal protection. Usually this is a duty not to act in a particular manner, and is breached by some affirmative state action.
A state can also breach this duty by its inaction when it is under an
affirmative duty to act in a situation to prevent private discrimination.32 An analysis of the Civil Rights Cases3 3 indicates that such a
duty exists in limited situations. Public inns, common carriers and
public utilities are under a common law duty to serve without discrimination every member of the general public who requests
their services.34 A refusal to serve a member of the public, when
accommodations are available, is an indictable offense.35 If state
law has imposed the status of a "public calling" on a business, then
the failure of state law to enforce the attendant duty to serve in a
nondiscriminatory manner would deny equal protection. Throughout the history of our country a clear distinction has been recognized between "public" and "private" schools. States have imposed upon public schools a duty comparable to that of a common
carrier, to serve the general public without discrimination. Thus
there would be no basis for finding that state inaction in "permitting" private schools to discriminate, and in failing to give the
Negro a right of action against this discrimination, has violated the
equal protection clause.
Some writers have approached the problem of state inaction
differently and have suggested a duty on the part of the state to
prevent discrimination as such in society.36 It is argued that whenever a state does not act to prevent discrimination by a private
person or school, this inaction enables the state to accomplish in31 345 U.S. 461, 73 S.Ct. 809 (1953). See 67 HARv. L. REv. 91 at 105 (1954), concluding
that the mere failure to suppress a practice not unlawful under state law is itself invalid
state action-at least if the electoral process is involved.
32 Huber, "Revolution in Private Law,'' 6 S.C. L.Q. 8 at 13 (1953). Truax v. Corrigan,
257 U.S. 312 at 332, 42 S.Ct. 124 (1921), stated that the due process clause ..• "makes a
required minimum of protection for every one's right of life, liberty, and property, which
the Congress of the legislature may not withhold."
38109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18 (1883).
34 Id. at 26 for Justice Harlan's dissent in the Civil Rights Cases.
35Ibid.
36 23 TEMPLE L.Q. 209 (1950). The note suggests that the test for the presence of state
action is not who acts, but what is done, to whom, and with what effect.
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directly the same discriminatory result which would be 'unconstitutional state action if done directly by statute, and is a tacit admission
that the private discrimination has state approval. Since the
Court, in cases alleging denial of equal protection, looks not to the
means employed but to the final discriminatory results achieved,
the conclusion follows that the state inaction denies equal protection. The result of this theory is to create in the state a duty to
act to prevent discrimination of any kind by any private person in
order to avoid having its inaction held a denial of equal protection.
The circularity of this argument indicates that the premise must
be accepted that under the Fourteenth Amendment there must
be a pre-existing duty to act before inaction is unconstitutional.
Another theory proposing a duty as all-pervading as that criticized
above suggests that the state's duty to act is co-extensive with, and
determined by, the extent to which its power can be used to prevent private discrimination and yet be within the bounds of due
process.37 But it is clear from Supreme Court decisions thus far
that the mere existence of power to act in certain areas to protect
rights does not, in and of itself, impose a duty on the state to act or
cause its inaction to be a denial of due process.38 Indeed, as far
as can be determined from Supreme Court decisions, the duty to
act imposed on a state by the equal protection clause exists only in
the traditionally inherent and essential areas of state concern and
activity.39 It is not at all clear that discrimination in general, or
discrimination in private schools in particular, is such an inherent
or essential area of state concern.
The Supreme Court, in the Brown case, concluded that only
when the state has undertaken to provide the opportunity of education must it be made available to all upon equal terms, thus implying that the equal protection clause does not impose any duty
upon the state to provide public education. But even if there
were such a duty, imposed either by the Fourteenth Amendment
or the state constitution, the failure to provide public schools could
be held to be state inaction sanctioning the action of those private
groups which did act (and thus denying equal protection to any
person discriminated against) if, and only if, it is assumed that
37 See

Hyman, "Segregation and the Fourteenth Amendment," 4

VAND.

L. REv. 555 at

565 (1951).
38 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684
at 687-688, 14 S.Ct. 913 (1894).
39 E.g., taxation, elections, and law enforcement are such areas. See note 32 supra. See
also 96 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 402 (1948).
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public schools alone can act in the area of education.40 The question whether education is an exclusive governmental function will
be discussed more thoroughly in the next section. It is sufficient
to note here that, even when a state constitution imposes a duty on
a state to provide public education, this is never thought to exclude
private schools. Indeed, the Supreme Court has specifically held
that it is unconstitutional for a state to make education a monopoly
of public schools by forbidding parents to send their children to
qualified private or parochial schools in satisfaction of the compulsory education laws. 41 To the extent that private and parochial
schools furnish the education of children they perform a state.
constitutional duty which the state would otherwise have to perform. Yet this type of state inaction has never been thought to
sanction or support the discrimination of private or parochial
schools within the meaning of the Civil Rights Cases.

D. State Action Where Private Persons Perform a Governmental Function. Even if it is assumed that a finding of state
action by reason of economic aid, withdrawal or inaction could be
avoided, the question still remains whether the federal courts
would find state action on a theory that the private school was
performing a function necessarily governmental. In light of the
express wording of the Fourteenth Amendment this suggestion is
a novel one, but there is strong support for it in the cases.42
The origin of the concept can be found in Justice Harlan's
dissent in the Civil Rights Cases.43 He contended that racially
discriminatory action by inns, common carriers, and theatres constituted state action because these businesses were really "agents"
of the state "charged with . . . duties . . . to the public."44
In essence the argument paralleled the reasoning of Munn v.
Illinois4 5 where the Court found that certain businesses are
"affected with a public interest." Admittedly, the Harlan theory
40 In support of such a position, see Emerson, "Segregation and the Equal Protection
Clause," 34 MINN. L. REv. 289 (1950); Leflar and Davis, "Segregation in the Public Schools
-1953," 67 HARv. L. REv. 377 at 404 (1954). See also Catlette v. United States, (4th Cir.
1943) 132 F. (2d) 902 at 907.
41 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571 (1925).
42 See, generally, Hale, "Rights Under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
Against Injuries Inflicted by Private Individuals," 6 LAw. GUILD REv. 627 (1946); Nicholson,
"The Legal Standing of the South's School Resistance Proposals," 7 S.C. L.Q. 1 at 41 (1954);
61 HARv. L. REv. 344 (1948); UNIV. PA. L. REv. 402 (1948). ·
43 109 U.S. 3 at 26, 3 S.Ct. 18 (1883).
44Id. at 41.
45 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
.

1154

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 54

has not been adopted in the sweeping terms in which it was first
announced, but the more recent cases indicate that the actions
of private persons performing governmental functions where matters of high public policy are concerned may be considered state
action.
The case which is most often cited as the basis for the governmental function concept is Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.46
In that case the Court held that racial discrimination by a labor
union violated the Fifth Amendment. The Court reasoned that
since federal statutes gave the Union its bargaining powers, the
union was in fact "clothed" with "powers comparable to those
possessed by a legislative body."47. Hence its acts were the acts
of Congress. Actually, the decision in the Steele case is based on
the factor of statutory control and not simply the nature of a labor
union's functions; 48 nevertheless, the reasoning of that case has
been relied on by the courts using a "governmental function"
theory.
A close parallel to the Steele decision can be found in Smith v.
Allwright/9 where the Court held that a refusal by the Democratic
Party of Texas to permit Negroes a vote in the primary election
was state action that violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Clearly,
the decision in the Allwright case is based on the element of statutory control. Again, however, there is dictum in the opinion of
the Court which indicates that weight was given to the public
importance of the election process.50 In any event, the later "white
primary" cases bear out this aspect of the A llwright decision. When
South Carolina wholly divested the election process of statutory
control, state action was still found. 51 While Rice v. Elmore
could conceivably be rested on the theory of withdrawal, as has
been suggested above, that theory is probably not a sound one.
On the other hand, these decisions stress that the election process
is a .function inherent in government. In one of these cases the
Court says: "Having undertaken to perform an important func46 323 U.S. 192,
47 Id. at 202.

65 S.Ct. 226 (1944).

48 See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768, 72 S.Ct. 1022 (1952),
where the Steele decision was expanded to cover the case where the discriminatory conduct
was directed at persons not entitled to membership in the union to which Congress had
delegated the exclusive bargaining powers. See also Syres v. OWIU, Local No. 23, 350 U.S.
892, 76 S.Ct. 152 (1955), noted in 54 MICH. L. REv. 567 (1956).
49 321 U.S. 649, 64 S.Ct. 757 (1944).
50 Id. at 660.
51 Rice v. Elmore, (4th Cir. 1947) 165 F. (2d) 387, cert. den. 333 U.S. 875, 68 S.Ct. 905
(1948); Baskin v. Brown, (4th Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 391.
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tion relating to the exercise of sovereignty by the people, they may
not violate the fundamental principles laid down by the Constitution . . . ." 52
Of all the "white primary" cases, however, the clearest recognition of the governmental function concept came in Terry v.
Adams.53 In that case the Court held that racial discrimination in
the elections of the Jaybird party, where candidates to the Texas
Democratic primary elections were nominated, was state action.
Here there was no statutory control, and not even any withdrawal
by the state from an area previously controlled. Since the winners
in the Jaybird election were inevitably elected to office, the Court
reasoned that this election was an "integral part . . . of the election process"54 and that the organization took on the attributes
of government.55 This reasoning of the concurring justices,
coupled with the fact situation in the Adams case, gives clear recognition to the governmental function concept; in fact, it would be
difficult to support the decision on any other basis.
The strongest authority for the governmental function concept of state action is the Court's decision in Marsh v. Alabama.56
There it was held that action by a company town, wholly owned
and operated by a private corporation, had led to a denial of liberty
without due process of law. In reaching this conclusion the Court
stated that there was no reason to treat a privately owned town
any differently from a regular municipality for purposes of the
state action concept. When viewed in that light, the Marsh
decision would seem to be a square holding by the Court that when
private persons perform a governmental function there is state
action.57 Although the New York Court of Appeals has refused
to follow the Marsh case,58 this decision has not received wide
approval59 ahd there seems to be no indication that the Supreme
Court would retreat from the position it took in the Marsh case.
52 Rice v. Elmore,
53 345 U.S. 461, 73

(4th Cir. 1947) 165 F. (2d) 387 at 391.
S.Ct. 809 (1953).
154 Id. at 469, in the opinion by Justice Black.
55 Id. at 484, in the opinion by Justice Clark.
56 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276 (1946).
57 There were actually two aspects of state action found in the Marsh case, one when
the company town attempted to exclude a Jehovah's Witness, and the second when the state
enforced a criminal trespass statute.
58 Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E. (2d) 541 (1949), cert. den.
339 U.S. 981, 70 S.Ct. 1019 (1950).
59 There was a strong dissenting opinion in the Stuyvesant case founded on the governmental function theory, and the majority opinion has been extensively criticized.
See 98 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 247 (1949); 15 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 745 (1948); 61 HARv. L. REv. 344
(1948).
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Relying on the labor union cases and the Adams and Marsh
cases, the federal courts have recognized the governmental functiori
concept in other contexts. Thus, where a private library refused
to admit Negroes to a training program, state action was found. 60
In that case, it is true, the element of economic aid played a major
role, but at the same time clear recognition was given to the governmental function theory. The concept has also been employed
where a franchised monopolistic carrier subjected a "captive
audience" to radio broadcasts, 61 but, on the other hand, one federal
court has refused to apply the concept to acts by a state board of
bar examiners. 62
The fundamental question suggested by these cases is whether
the courts will find that education is an "inherently governmental
function" so that even if the schools are operated by private persons, acts of discrimination will be deemed state action. At the
outset it must be noted that there is a basic distinction between
education and activities such as operating election machinery or
managing a company town. In the latter cases it can b~ said that
the function is intrinsically one of government, going to its very
essence; whereas, the function of education, while traditionally
performed by government, is a service which is capable of purely
private operation. Thus, in the one case the function is directed
to the control of human conduct, which is inherently governmental,
while in the other case the function is directed to the enlightenment
of the human mind, which can be, but does not necessarily have
to be, the function of government. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters63
it was held that a state could not adopt legislation which would
compel all children within a given age group to attend the public
schools. In so deciding the Supreme Court stated that, ". . .
the act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control." 64 Thus, the Court indicated that education
is an activity which not only can be validly performed by private
groups, but also, that when privately operated, it may not be unreasonably restrained by the state. Nevertheless, when the private
school denies racial equality it might yet be argued that, since
60 Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Library, (4th Cir. 1945) 149 F. (2d) 212, cert. den. 326 U.S. 721,
66 S.Ct. 26 (1945).
61 See Pollak v. Public Utilities Commission, (D.C. Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d) 450, revd. on
other grounds 343 U.S. 451, 72 S.Ct. 813 (1952).
62 Mason v. Hitchcock, (1st Cir. 1939) 108 F. (2d) 134.
63 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571 (1925).
64 Id. at 534.

1956]

COMMENTS

1157

education is traditionally a function government engages in, it
is the kind of activity which falls within the meaning of state
action. It must not be forgotten that the states have always
recognized education as a primary function of the government.
Moreover, the Supreme Court in the Brown case expressly stated
by way of dictum that education is one of the most important functions of the states. 615
A more fundamental problem inherent in classifying education
as a public function, which when publicly or privately conducted
is state action, arises when the question is asked, how far can the
doctrine be carried? To rely on the doctrine in all areas of overlapping public and private conduct would seem to work a perversion of any understandable meaning of the term "state action."
Certainly grave questions are presented when the governmental
function concept is considered in regard to parks, public carriers,
golf courses, cemeteries, and parochial schools. Could we say in
all these cases that since they are activities which are performed
by government they are governmental functions which when performed by private persons become subjected to the restraints of
the Fourteenth Amendment? In this regard it may be noted that
the courts which have applied the "governmental function" concept have restricted it to cases where matters of "high public
policy" 66 were involved. While such a restriction on the doctrine
is ambiguous it does demonstrate that the courts would not be
willing to apply the doctrine to all types of conduct performed
under both public and private control. At the same time it is
likely that the continuance of racial segregation in the schools
would present the "high public policy" issue which the courts
have contemplated in developing the governmental function concept.
A further question arises as to what the effect would be of
state constitutional provisions which affirmatively stipulate that
education is no longer a public function. One writer has suggested
that these provisions may be given effect by the courts. 67 On the
65 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686 (1954). See also University
of Southern California v. Robbins, I Cal. App. (2d) 523, 37 P. (2d) 163 (1934), cert. den..
295 U.S. 738, 55 S.Ct. 650 (1935).
66 See Hale, "Rights Under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments Against Injuries Inflicted by Private Individuals," 6 LAw. GUILD REv. 627 at 633 (1946). See also
Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512 at 534, 87 N.E. (2d) 541 (1949), cert. den.
339 U.S. 981, 70 S.Ct. 1019 (1950); Rice v. Elmore, (4th Cir. 1947) 165 F. (2d) 387 at 391.
67 Nicholson, "The Legal Standing of the South's School Resistance Proposals," 7 S.C.
L.Q. I at 44 (1954).
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other hand, the reasoning of the South Carolina white primary
cases seems compelling here. There, the state legislature expunged
all right to control the primary elections from the statute books but
it was held that the election remained a governmental function
just the same. Certainly the Marsh and Adams decisions do not
indicate that the governmental function concept depends on how
the state labels the action. Rather, all of these cases are predicated
on the inherent nature of the function itself and not the state's
own definition of the activity.
An added problem inherent in the governmental function
cases, which the courts have not considered, stems from the reasoning in the majority opinion of the Civil Rights Cases. It was there
indicated that the rationale for the state action concept was that
while a private person can interfere with another's rights, only a
governmental body can deprive one of life, liberty, or property
without due process or deny equal protection. While the later
decisions of the Court do not reiterate this distinction in the precise wording of the Civil Rights Cases~ the Court has never indicated that this rationale is erroneous. When the governmental
function concept is employed, however, the question arises whether
~he courts are changing the original understanding of state action
and finding that private persons have actually deprived a person
of his rights and not merely interfered with them. There are two
ways in which the logical difficulty thus presented might be resolved. First, the courts might find that the private group performing the governmental function has become so powerful that
it can in fact deprive others of their rights and not merely interfere with them. It is extremely unlikely, however, that the courts
will take that view in light of the language of the Civil Rights
Cases. It is more probable that the courts will find that, by performing public functions the private persons have become instru, mentalities of the state, and hence their action state action. 68 In
any event, the courts do follow this theory in the economic aid
cases, and it would seem to offer the soundest solution in the
governmental function cases.
As developed, a governmental function theory would seem to
offer the courts a basis for striking down all of the proposals for
continuing racial segregation in education through private
68 The reasoning of the governmental function cases seems to support this view. See,
e.g.: Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226 (1944); Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 73 S.Ct. 809 (1953).
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schools. Although it may be doubted that the concept would
be extended to make all action by private schools state action, the
forcefulness of the Brown decision indicates that the Court may
be willing to rely on it to prevent continued racial segregation.
In any event, the point should not be overlooked that this theory
could always be used in conjunction with facts showing economic
aid by the state to find state action.

E. State Action Through Court Action. It has long been
recognized that the action of a state court can be state action. Thus,
where a state court omitted the names of Negroes from its jury
lists, it was held that failure to perform this "ministerial"69 function was state action. It has also been held that court action can
be state action when the state court fails to provide a fair criminal
trial, 70 proceeds to trial in a civil action without giving adequate
notice,71 or enforces the principles of the common law in such a
manner as to deprive a person of property without due process of
law.72 The major step in the recognition of state court action as
state action came in Shelley v. Kraemer73 where the Court held that
state court enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant contained
in a deed was state action denying equal protection of the laws.
The importance of the Shelley case lies in the fact that the prior
cases of state action by court action were cases where the actual
denial of due process, or equal protection was based simply on the
act of the court. The Shelley case added the factor of pre-existing
private discrimination, which is clearly outside the Fourteenth
Amendment, but which becomes state action through the state
court's enforcement of it. Thus the rule of Shelley v. Kraemer
does not prohibit the private discrimination as such, but it does
say that a state court cannot enforce this private conduct without
transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although some writers have indicated that the Shelley doctrine
is so broad that it practically wipes away the old requirement of
state action,74 it may be doubted whether the case can be given
69 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
70Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 43 S.Ct. 265 (1923); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 53 S.Ct. 55 (1932).
71 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
72 American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S.Ct. 568 (1941); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900 (1940).
78 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948).
74 Nicholson, "The Legal Standing of the South's School Resistance Proposals,'' 7 S.C.
L.Q. 1 (1954); Barnett, "Race-Restrictive Covenants Restricted,'' 28 ,ORE. L. REv. 1 (1948);
48 CoL. L. REv. 1241 (1948).
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such an expansive interpretation. If a private school corporation, in violation of its charter, entered into a contract with a
Negro student to admit him to its course of instruction, the Shelley
rule would seem to be applicable to a state court enforcement of
the discriminatory charter provision. In that type of case, as in
the case of court enforcement of a restrictive covenant, the court
would be relying on the restrictive covenant or clause to deprive
the Negro of a property or a contract right. Since it is unlikely
that the suit would arise in the manner suggested, the crucial
question is, would it be state action that abridged the Fourteenth
Amendment if a Negro sued to gain admittance to a private school
and the state court dismissed? In this situation the Negro has no
contract or property right of which he is deprived by virtue of the
court's dismissal. Consequently, there is grave doubt that the
doctrine of Shelley v. Kraemer could be applied to bring the court's
action within the meaning of state action that denies equal protection to the Negro. 76
There is some indication, however, that the equal protection
issue can be raised in a different manner. In Barrows v. ]ackson16
a white property owner had conveyed his land to a Negro in violation of a restrictive covenant. A suit for damages based on the
breach of the covenant was brought against the grantor and the
Supreme Court held that damages could not be allowed on the
authority of Shelley v. Kraemer. In the Barrows case it was found
that the white property owner could assert the Negro's right to
equal protection in defense of the damage suit. While this decision flies in the face of the usual rule that in order to assert a
constitutional right a litigant must have standing to raise the question, 77 the Supreme Court has indicated that the standing question may in some situations be waived. Thus, the Court found in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters18 that a private school corporation could
successfully attack the adoption of a state statute which would
have compelled every child in the state, within a prescribed age
group, to attend public schools. In that case the Court allowed
the private school to protect its property interests by asserting the
personal right of liberty belonging to parents and children, which
persons were not before the Court, as a basis for striking down the
75 See Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W. (2d) 110
(1953), affd. 348 U.S. 880, 75 S.Ct. 122 (1954).
76 346 U.S. 249, 73 S.Ct. 1031 (1953).
77 Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 63 S.Ct. 493 (1943).
78 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571 (1925).
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statute. It was this same reasoning which led the Court in the
Barrows case to find that the injury which would result to the
white property owner in the form of the damage remedy permitted
him to rely on the Negro's right to equal protection. The Court
stated:
"But in the instant case, we are faced with a unique situation in which it is the action of the state court which might
result in a denial of constitutional rights and in which it would
be difficult if not impossible for the persons whose rights are
asserted to present their grievance before any court. Under
the peculiar circumstances of this case, we believe the reasons which underlie our rule denying standing to raise another's rights, which is only a rule of practice, are outweighed
by the need to protect the fundamental rights which would
be denied by permitting the damages action to be maintained. " 79
It must be carefully noted that in the Barrows case the Court
sought to protect the rights of minority classes who would in the
future be prevented from acquiring property interests if the damage remedy were permitted, although these persons had no standing themselves to raise the issue. In both the Pierce and Barrows
cases the crucial fact is that some person or legal entity would be
deprived of a valuable contract, property, or other legal right if the
statute or covenant, which is unconstitutional by reference to some
other group, is enforced. Moreover, in these cases the Court
could invalidate any future effectiveness of the statute or covenant
since in the future neither could be relied on as a basis of right.
Unlike the enforcement of a compulsory public education statute
or a restrictive covenant, however, when a private school excludes
a Negro it cannot be said in all cases that the act of discrimination
will deprive some person or legal entity of a property or contract
right. When a restrictive covenant is enforced by a damage remedy
the injury to the grantor is direct, immediate, and will occur in
all cases. On the other hand, it is difficult to conceive of a case
where the Court could protect some person's rights in such a
manner as to prevent a private school from performing future acts
of discrimination.
In either the Shelley type of case or the Barrows type of case,
therefore, the person or group which seeks to invalidate the private acts of discrimination must have some existing legal right of
79

Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 at 257, 73 S.Ct. 1031 (1953).
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which he would be deprived before the equal protection question
can be raised. He might then rely on the denial of equal protection which results to the Negro, when the state court enforces
private discrimination, as a basis for protecting this other right.
When, however, the private school has done no more than refuse
to admit the Negro it cannot be said that there is an injury to
an existing right which would entitle some person to sue. In light
of this fact it may be doubted th;at the doctrine of state action
through court action will be of much significance in an attack on
private school plans.

II.

School Assignment Plans

A second proposal that has been advanced to permit continued
segregation in education is the "individual assignment plan." Unlike the private school plans, this device does not seek to avoid
completely the holding of the Brown case, but is rather predicated
on a philosophy of delay. Generally, the assignment plans provide
for the placement of each individual child in the particular public
school that educational officials determine he should enter. This
determination, by the terms of the statutory plans now in existence, would be made on the basis of such factors as ability, physical
proximity to the school, and available school space.80 The plans
also permit the assignment to be appealed through a hierarchy of
administrative boards and finally through the state's court system.81
When the assignments are being made on an obvious racial basis
the crucial question is whether the aggrieved persons can enter
the federal courts and obtain an injunction to restrain the action
of the assigning board. The hurdle that stands in the path of
the federal injunction is the doctrine that before a federal court
will enjoin state administrative action, state remedies must have
been exhausted.82 The Supreme Court has not yet considered the
exhaustion rule as it is related to segregation cases, but the sources
of the rule, the extent of its application, and the limits which have
been imposed upon it, indicate the problems these plans present,
and the possible paths the Court may take.
so Ala. Code (1940; Supp. 1955) tit. 52, §61 (4); N.C. Gen. Stat. (1953; Supp. 1955)
§§115-176 to 115-179. See also La. Rev. Stat. (1950; Supp. 1954) tit. 17, §81.1.
81 See Ex parte Board of Education, (Ala. 1956) 84 S. (2d) 653; Nicholson, "The Legal
Standing of the South's School Resistance Proposals," 7 S.C.L.Q. 1 (1954).
82 See DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw §182 (1951); Stason, "Timing of Judicial Redress
From Erroneous Administrative Action," 25 MINN. L. REv. 560 (1941); Berger, "Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies," 48 YALE L.J. 981 (1939); 46 Iu.. L. REv. 756 (1951).
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The doctrine of exhaustion of state administrative remedies
is one that is well established in the field of administrative law.
While it has been suggested that the rule arose out of the general
rule of equity that relief will not be given where there is an adequate legal remedy,83 those cases where a declaratory judgment was
denied84 for the same reason indicate that the rule has come to
stand on its own feet. Perhaps the real foundation of the exhaustion rule is a principle of comity8 5 similar to the Court's holdings
that it will not rule on the constitutionality of a state statute until
it has been interpreted by the highest court in the state,86 and that
in habeas corpus proceedings the writ may not be issued by the
federal courts to obtain a prisoner's release from state custody until
all the available state remedies have been tried. 87 An additional
consideration is found in the cases where the rule was applied to
federal administrative action. Here the courts have been able to
rely on congressional statutes which grant the agency exclusive
jurisdiction or permit appeals only from final orders as a basis for
requiring that the administrative remedy be exhausted.88 Since
the courts have not generally distinguished the federal and state
cases in applying the rule, these federal cases have helped to develop
the rule as a general principle of administrative law.89 It would
seem, however, that since different considerations lie behind the
rule as applied to federal and to state agencies the courts in proper
circumstances should distinguish the federal cases from the state
cases where the rule is predicated not on a grant of exclusive jurisdiction but on a principle of comity.
While the foregoing general considerations explain the reason
for the development of the rule, it can be supported by more practical considerations today. The courts have recognized that the
specialized skills of the agency's personnel make them more adept
than judges at handling technical problems.00 Moreover, when the
administrative action is complete, it is felt that only the basic policy
questions will remain for judicial solution. Certainly these argu83 See

39 CoRN. L.Q. 273 (1954).

84 See Public Service Commission
85 Pacific Telephone&: Telegraph

v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 73 S.Ct. 236 (1952).
Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U.S. 196, 44 S.Ct. 553 (1924).
See also Berger, "Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies," 48 YALE L.J. 981 (1939).
86 Spector Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 65 S.Ct. 152 (1944).
87 Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 70 S.Ct. 587 (1950).
88 See DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw §§186, 187 (1951).
89 MeyeIS v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 58 S.Ct. 459 (1938); Aircraft
& Diesel Equipment Corp. v. HiISch, 331 U.S. 752, 67 S.Ct. 1493 (1947).
90 See DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §184 (1951).
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ments have persuasive force in the rate regulation and assessment
cases. A corollary of the specialized skill argument is the argument
that a federal court should not interfere with legislative action
until it is complete. Since action by an administrative body is
partly legislative, this argument concludes that the courts should
maintain a hands-off policy until it is complete.91
While the cases indicate that the federal courts have adhered
to the exhaustion rule rather strictly, the sources of the rule and
the rationale for its present existence suggest that it may not be so
strictly applied to the assignment plans. Certainly if a court were
to consider that the rule is similar to the old equity rule, that it is
basically a principle of comity, and depends largely on the expertise of administrative personnel, it might very well refuse to apply
the rule in balancing those factors against continued racial segregation in education. In applying the exhaustion rule to state
administrative action the Supreme Court has not made clear
whether the rule is mandatory or discretionary. In some cases it
has been held that the rule is a prerequisite to federal relief, 92 and
in other cases it has been said the rule is to be applied in the discretion of the federal courts.93 It has been suggested that even
where the Court has taken the mandatory approach it actually
considered the equities of the case before it.94 Which view the
Court will take of the rule becomes quite crucial to the success of
the school assignment plans; certainly the problems raised by those
plans present a strong case for a discretionary application of the
rule.
Whatever the general approach may be the cases indicate that
the rule is applicable across a wide range of administrative activity.
N eve:r;;theless it has had limits placed upon it. If the administrative board is wholly without jurisdiction over a particular case,95
or is incapable of giving the relief sought,96 or if the ruling of the
administrative board is in clear violation of a statute, the courts
will not require an exhaustion.97 Where the time for obtaining
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 211 U.S. 210, 29 S.Ct. 67 (1908).
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 58 S.Ct. 459 (1938). See also
42 ILL. L. REv. 677 (1947).
93 United States v. Abilene&: So. Ry. Co., 265 U.S. 274, 44 S.CL 565 (1924); Natural Gas
Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 302 U.S. 300, 58 S.Ct. 199 (1937).
94 See 44 MICH. L. REv. 1035 at 1039 (1946).
95 Public Utilities Comm. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 217 U.S. 456, 63 S.Ct. 369 (1943).
But cf. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 58 S.Ct. 459 (1938).
96 Order of Railway Conductors of America v. Swan, 329 U.S. 520, 67 S.CL 405 (1947).
97 Wettre v. Hague, (1st Cir. 1948) 168 F. (2d) 825.
91
92
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administrative relief is unreasonably short,98 or where the agency
waits an unreasonable time before acting, the courts have likewise
excused a failure to exhaust.99 These limitations are somewhat
mechanical and can be met by a carefully drafted and applied
statute. More serious limitations may arise when the litigant
alleges that he is suffering irreparable injury or is being deprived
of a constitutional right. Generally, the Supreme Court has
refused to excuse the exhaustion requirement when the only
irreparable injury alleged is the expense of trying a case through
a system of complicated administrative procedure.100 On the other
hand, the Court has held that exhaustion can be excused where a
public utility's rates were set at a confiscatory level.101 While
there must be a clear showing of irreparable injury in the confiscatory rate cases there seems to be a growing tendency for the
courts to consider that factor. A recent case indicated by way of
dictum that a "paramount consideration" in the application of
the rule is the nature of the injury.102 Although the irreparable
injury cases have so far concerned only monetary injuries it would
seem that the denial of access to the public schools on a nonsegregated basis would provide the courts with an even clearer case
to which the same line of reasoning could be applied.
Probably the most confusing aspect of the exhaustion rule is
the method by which the courts have applied it when constitutional
questions are raised. A litigant desiring to make a constitutional
attack on the assignment plans could do so in at least three ways.
First, the attack might be directed at the constitutionality of the
statute the administrative board is enforcing. It is not clear that
exhaustion will be excused in this situation,103 although a leading
text-writer points out that since the agency has no power to rule
on the constitutionality of a statute, there is a strong argument for
excusing the requirement.104 Secondly, a constitutional attack
might be directed at the way in which the agency enforces the
Munn v. Des Moines Nat. Bank, (8th Cir. 1927) 18 F. (2d) 269.
See Stason, "Timing of Judicial Redress From Erroneous Administrative Action,"
25 MINN. L. REv. 560 (1941).
100 Petroleum Exploration Co. v. Public Service Comm., 304 U.S. 209, 58 S.Ct. 834
(1938).
101 Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U.S. 196, 44 S.Ct. 553 (1924);
Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co., 262 U.S. 43, 43 S.Ct. 446 (1923). See also DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §188 (1951).
102 Hardy v. Rossell, (D.C. N.Y. 1955) 135 F. Supp. 260.
10s Air Craft and Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 67 S.Ct. 1493 (1947).
104 See DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §190 (1951); Stason, "Timing of Judicial Redress
From Erroneous Administrative Action," 25 MINN. L. REv. 560 (1941).
98
99
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statute. Since the agency generally would have power to rule on
the constitutionality of the statute as applied, there seems to be no
good reason for excusing exhaustion. In any event, in this situation the courts have not relaxed the requirement.105 Thirdly,
and perhaps most effectively, an attack can be made on the constitutionality of the legislation which created the agency. Again,
it could be said that the agency would have no power to rule on
the constitutionality of the statute. Whether or not that theory
is sound, when the attack is made in this manner the courts have
indicated that exhaustion may be excused. In Yakus v. United
States106 the Supreme Court stated by way of dictum that if it can
be said in advance that the administrative remedy is incapable
of providing due process, exhaustion of the state remedy will not
be required. While the Court has adhered to that rule when the
attack is on the basic enabling legislation, it has required a strong
showing of incapacity.107 These cases indicate, in any event, that
a procedural setup designed to thwart the raising of constitutional
questions may be a denial of due process. Certainly this argument
takes on added weight by virtue of the fact that most of the constitutional attacks made on the exhaustion requirement have been in
cases where commercial or property rights were concerned. There
may be stronger reasons to excuse exhaustion where personal
rights of liberty and equal protection are involved.
The foregoing considerations of the source of the exhaustion
rule, the extent of its application, and the limits which have been
imposed upon it indicate that while the rule has at times been
strictly applied it may be excused in proper circumstances. The
Supreme Court has not considered the exhaustion rule as applied
to the school assignment plans, and the decisions by the lower
federal courts have been conflicting. Prior to the decision in the
Brown case it was held in Bruce v. Stillwell108 that there was no
need to exhaust administrative remedies where a Negro was excluded from entering a public school, although in that case there
was no specific administrative remedy available. Since the decision
in the Brown case, the Alabama court109 and a federal court of
appeals110 have found that exhaustion of remedies is a prerequisite
105 Allen v. Grand Central Aircraft, 347 U.S. 535, 74 S.Ct., 745 (1954). But cf. Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 66 S.Ct. 445 (1945).
106 321 U.S. 414, 64 S.Ct. 660 (1944).
107 Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 67 S.Ct. 1493 (1947).
108 (5th Cir. 1953) 206 F. (2d) 554.
109 Ex parte Board of Education, (Ala. 1956) 84 S. (2d) 653.
110 Carson v. Board of Education, (4th Cir. 1955) 227 F. (2d) 789.
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to state court or federal court injunctions directed at the administrative assignment. On the other hand, a federal district court has
reached a different result on the ground that there had been an
exhaustion as a practical matter.111 While the present case law on
the exhaustion requirement, as it is related to the assignment plans,
is not indicative of how the courts will ultimately decide the issue,
considering that the rule has for the most part been applied to
the tax, regulatory, and rate assessment cases, that it is largely a
rule of comity, and that the courts have been willing to limit the
rule in cases of irreparable injury and constitutional rights, there
would seem to be strong reasons for the courts to refuse to apply
it to the school assignment plans.

III. Exercise of Police Power
A. School Districts. The power of a state to create and alter
the geographical boundaries of school districts for the best educational interests of the state is limited only by the standard of reasonableness. As long as the resulting school district is geographically
reasonable it would probably be a valid exercise of the power
even though the district is also planned to be all-white or allNegro.112 A school districting plan, however, which prohibited
a student from attending the nearest school would deny that
student equal protection if other students in the same area could
attend the school.113 Even when districts are drawn without regard
to race, many single-race schools result because of residential distribution. The Brown case apparently would not require states
to set up school districts in such a way as to insure racial integration in every school, but would allow normal geographical school
districts even though the result was some degree of segregation.
Since the residential use of land cannot be zoned along racial
lines,1 14 a city could not in this way freeze the racial character of
land to conform to present one-race school districts. Continual
redistricting of school areas in order to counter racial residential
shifts and maintain one-race school districts would indicate an
unreasonable alteration of school districts on the basis of racial,
111 Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board, (D.C. La. 1956) 138 F. Supp. 337.
112 Leflar and Davis, "Segregation in the Public Schools-1953," 67 HARv. L.

REv. 337
at 404 (1954).
113 This was a denial of equal protection even under the separate but equal doctrine
[Carter v. School Board of Arlington County, (4th Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 531] and even
though a child usually has no right to attend the nearest school. Scown v. Czarnecki, 264
Ill. 305, 106 N.E. 276 (1914).
114 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 30 S.Ct. 16 (1917).
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not geographical, criteria.11 5 Just as racial zoning of residential
areas is an unreasonable exercise of the police power which denies
the equal protection of property rights, so racial zoning of school
districts would be an unreasonable exercise of power denying equal
protection of the right to a non-segregated public school education.
The practice of gerrymandering political districts has been
declared by the Supreme Court to be a non-justiciable "political
question," i.e., one to be determined solely by the legislative and
executive branches.11 6 But reliance on that decision to justify
discriminatory districting of school areas is misplaced. The Court
has seldom treated an issue as a political question, and then only
when the Court felt that it lacked adequate judicial criteria for
an adjudication of the issue on its merits.11 7 The Court has felt
no such uncertainty in the fields of public education or civil rights.

B. Classification by Results of Tests. Since they are inherently unequal, separate schools have meant a lifetime of inferior
education for most Negroes. To integrate the races solely upon
the factor of age when there is a substantial gap in the quality of
their past education, or solely upon the factor of the quality of their
past education which would mean a gap in physical ages, is unfair
to both races in their competition inside and outside the classroom.118 If a state classified children of equal ages into several
groups on the basis of non-discriminatory objective criteria such
as knowledge, intelligence and proficiency, and assigned each group
to a separate school, this would be a reasonable classification and
would perhaps achieve segregation to some extent for a limited
time.11 9 Only if the statute were unjustly administered or so indefinite as to put unlimited and uncontrolled discretion in the
hands of administrators would there be a denial of equal protection.120
115 See Webb v. School District, 167 Kan. 395, 206 P. (2d) 1066 (1949); Hooker v.
Greenville, 130 N.C. 472 (1902).
116 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 66 S.Ct. 1198 (1946).
117 See 56 YALE L.J. 127 (1946).
118 Gradual desegregation for educational or administrative reasons, not racial reasons,
would be less vulnerable to constitutional attack. See Garver, "Legal Requirements for
Admission to Public Schools," 20 LAw AND CoNTEM. PROB. 23 (1955).
119 A state may properly use literary tests as a reasonable means of classification. Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 18 S.Ct. 583 (1898) ("read or understand" clause valid
on face; discrimination in application alleged, not proved); Guinn v. United States, 238
U.S. 347, 35 S.Ct. 926 (1915) (literacy test, though valid, fell because inseparable from
invalid "grandfather clause"). But see Davis v. Schnell, (D.C. Ala. 1949) 81 F. Supp. 872,
affd. 336 U.S. 933, 69 S.Ct. 749 (1949) ("understand and explain" clause invalid on face
because standard used was not definite and reasonable enough to minimize chance of discriminatory application; immaterial that race not mentioned in test).
120 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 at 373-374, 6 S.Ct. 1064 (1886). Leflar and Davis,
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C. Segregation for Public Peace and Safety. The majority
in Plessy v. Ferguson121 held a segregation statute valid as a reasonable exercise of a state's police power to preserve public peace and
order. The first attack on this justification came when the Court
held that racial residential zoning could not be supported as a reasonable exercise of police power to preserve public peace and
order.122 The Brown case made it clear that racial segregation in
education, even though enforced pursuant to a state's police power,
denied equal protection. The Court realized that segregation is
premised on the inequality of the two races and therefore will
necessarily place the minority race at a disadvantage. By their very
nature, then, segregation statutes result in unequal protection and
are thus inherently unreasonable exercises of the police power.
There will undoubtedly be attempts to maintain segregation
indirectly ostensibly by using other criteria than race as a basis
for classification.123 History has shown, however, that the Court
will more readily look through the form to the substance of legislation when racial discrimination is involved than when other
questionable exercises of the police power are alleged.124

Conclusion
The multiplicity of legal problems which have arisen from the
revolutionary change in judicial thinking wrought by the Brown
decision indicate that the now wholly rejected "separate but equal
doctrine" was founded more on a principle of social expediency
than of judicial logic. It is apparent that the resistance proposals
are, at best, by-products of the underlying social philosophy which
developed and sustained racial segregation not only in the public
schools but in other areas of social, economic, and political life.
While the foregoing analysis of the individual proposals suggests
the variety of answers available to the courts, it would seem fair
to say that the courts are still confronted with the same underlying
policy question that existed before the Brown decision in the
"Segregation in the Public Schools-1953," 67 HARv. L. REv. 377 at 404, 410 (1954).
121163 U.S. 537 at 550, 16 S.Ct. ll38 (1896).
122 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 30 S.Ct. 16 (1917).
123 Segregation is not validated because tied into an approved public policy. City of
Richmond v. Deans, (4th Cir. 1930) 37 F. (2d) 712, alfd. 281 U.S. 704, 50 S.Ct. 407 (1930).
If the fear of racial intermarriage, and not the maintenance of the South's economic system, is the reason for segregation, then schools segregated on the basis of sex would minimize social contact, achieve integration and probably be a valid basis of educational classification.
124 Compare Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 35 S.Ct. 926 (1915) with United
States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 73 S.Ct. 510 (1953).
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application of the separate but equal test. The question is,
should the courts move rapidly in striking down racial segregation, or should the dominant philosophy be one of gradual desegregation. Before, the question was, "what are equal facilities?"
Now the question is, "are the resistance proposals valid?" It is
clear that in the Brown decision the Court recognized the enforcement problem. This might indicate that the gradual approach
will dominate the Court's thinking in considering the resistance
proposals. On the other hand, the growing desire on the part
of the Court to protect personal liberty, coupled with the impact
which racial discrimination has on international relations, suggests
that the resistance proposals will be subjected to severe judicial
scrutiny.
John B. Huck, S.Ed.
David L. Nelson

